

A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence

Volume 1

The Law and the Right

A Reappraisal of the Reality that Ought to Be

by

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INVESTIGACIONES
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on the Author and the Contributors	XV
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Editor's Preface	XIX
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Assistant Editor's Preface	XXXI
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INVESTIGACIONES
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Part One - The Reality That Ought to Be: Problems and Critical Issues	1
--	---

Chapter 1 - A First Glance	3
-----------------------------------	---

1.1. The Reality That Ought to Be as Opposed to the Reality That Is	3
1.2. The Law and the Right. What Is Objectively Right and What Is Subjectively Right	5
1.3. What Is Objectively Right as the Content of Norms. Four Meanings of "Right"	9

Chapter 2 - Dualism and Interaction between the Reality That Ought to Be and the Reality That Is: Validity as a Pineal Gland	13
---	----

2.1. Constitutive Types and Valid Tokens as Independent of Norms	13
2.1.1. <i>Validity as Congruence</i>	13
2.1.2. <i>Some People Speak of Types. The So-called Typicality of Law</i>	15
2.1.3. <i>Other People Presuppose Types</i>	17
2.1.4. <i>Types Are Constitutive, Rules Are Regulative</i>	18
2.1.5. <i>Simple and Compound Types and Tokens</i>	20
2.1.6. <i>Competence, or Capacity</i>	21
2.2. The Chain of Normative Production. The So-called Typicality of Law	22
2.2.1. <i>The Primacy of the Reality That Ought to Be</i>	22
2.2.2. <i>Valid and Invalid Behaviours</i>	24
2.2.2.1. <i>Noblesse Oblige</i>	24
2.2.2.2. <i>Four Possibilities</i>	27
2.2.3. <i>Ought-Effects Are neither Valid nor Invalid</i>	32

Chapter 3 - Taking a Dive into the Sources of Law	35
3.1. Where to Jump in From	35
3.2. Facts, Acts, and Transactions as Valid Is-Events Which Cause Ought-Effects in What Is Subjectively Right	35
3.2.1. <i>Generalia</i>	35
3.2.2. <i>Is-Facts Strictly Understood</i>	36
3.2.3. <i>Is-Acts Strictly Understood</i>	37
3.2.4. <i>Transactions, or Declarations of Will</i>	38
3.3. Distinguishing Ought-Effects in What Is Subjectively Right from Ought-Effects in What Is Objectively Right	39
3.4. Sources of Law as Valid Is-Events (Facts, Acts, and Declarations of Will) Which Cause Ought-Effects in What Is Objectively Right	41
3.5. Sources of Law as Ought-Effects (in What Is Objectively Right) Caused by Sources of Law as Valid Is-Events	43
3.6. The Sovereign Normative Will as the Source of Positive Law in the Natural-Law School and in German Legal Positivism Alike	47
3.6.1. <i>Two Glorious Examples</i>	47
3.6.2. <i>The State of Nature and the Promise</i>	48
3.6.3. <i>What Divides and What Unites the Natural-Law School and German Legal Positivism</i>	51
 Chapter 4 - The Problem of the Matrix	 57
4.1. The Matrix of Normativeness as the Ultimate Source of What Is Right by Virtue of Human-Posited Norms	57
4.2. A Problem of Authenticity	61
4.2.1. <i>Orthogonal Norms and Straight Rules</i>	61
4.2.2. <i>A Few Qualifying Remarks</i>	64
4.2.3. <i>Umm al-Kitāb: The Mother of the Book, or the Matrix of the Koran</i>	66
4.2.4. <i>The Great-Grandmother of Positive Human Law</i>	69
4.3. Nature as the Matrix of Normativeness	70
4.3.1. <i>A Traditional Starting Point</i>	70
4.3.2. <i>Nature as the Will of God</i>	74
4.3.3. <i>Nature as Biological Instinct</i>	75
4.3.4. <i>Nature as Divine and Human Reason</i>	77
4.3.5. <i>Nature as the Cosmic Order</i>	78
4.4. The Origin of the Term <i>Jus Positivum</i>	80

Part Two - The Reality That Ought to Be: A Monistic Perspective. Norms as Beliefs and as Motives of Behaviour	83
Chapter 5 - The Motives of Human Behaviour	85
5.1. Summary of Part One and Brief Considerations on Some Legal-Philosophical Orientations	85
5.2. Encoding of Behaviour-Types: Human Personality and Culture	89
5.3. The Conditional Connection between Types of Action and Types of Circumstance. Habits and Practices	90
5.4. Needs, Interests, Values, and Norms	92
Chapter 6 - Norms as Beliefs	97
6.1. The Concepts of Norm and Custom	97
6.2. The Existence of a Norm Presupposes at Least One Believer (Doxia)	98
6.3. The Conditionality of the Content of a Norm: The Type of Action and the Type of Circumstance. More on What Is Objectively Right	101
6.4. The Referents of a Norm: Being a Duty-Holder (Deontia) or a Right-Holder (Exousia). More on What Is Subjectively Right	105
6.5. The Being-in-Force of a Norm: Being a Duty-Holder and a Believer (Nomia). The Not-Being-in-Force of a Norm: Being a Duty-Holder and a Nonbeliever (Anomia)	108
6.6. The Efficaciousness and Inefficaciousness of a Norm: Abiding and Deviant Duty-Holders. The Whited Sepulchres and the Jesuits. Efficacious Norms as a Subset of Effective Norms	109
6.7. In the Case of Anomia, a Norm Can Be either Obeyed (Conformism of Duty-Holding Nonbelievers) or Not Obeyed (Nonconformism of Duty-Holding Nonbelievers), but It Cannot Be Efficacious or Inefficacious	112
6.8. Practising Duty-Holders and Non-Practising Duty-Holders	113
Chapter 7 - How Norms Proliferate in Human Brains	115
7.1. Subsuming Valid Tokens under a Type of Circumstance and Producing Derivative Norms from the Type of Action Conditionally Connected with the Type of Circumstance	115
7.2. Proliferation from Norms of Conduct. Static Systems and Dynamic Systems	117
7.3. Proliferation from Competence Norms	123

Part Three - Family Portraits. Law as Interference in the Motives of Behaviour	129
Chapter 8 - No Law without Norms	131
8.1. Family Portraits. A Normativistic Gallery: Axel Hägerström, Karl Olivecrona, and H. L. A. Hart 1961	131
8.1.1. <i>A Caution for All Visitors</i>	131
8.1.2. <i>A Critique of Voluntarism in Favour of Normativism</i>	131
8.1.3. <i>Norms versus Commands</i>	133
8.1.3.1. Diversity among the Contextual Requirements	133
8.1.3.2. What Is Objectively Right: The Internal Point of View, a Point of View Internalised in the Brains of Believers, and Which Manifests Itself in Their Use of a Typically Normative Language	134
8.1.3.3. Universalisability of Norms (Catholodoxia)	135
8.1.3.4. Justified Reaction to Transgression (Dikedoxia)	136
8.1.4. <i>In What Sense Can a Norm Be Said to Exist (Doxia)</i>	137
8.1.5. <i>Constitutional Norms (Hägerström and Olivecrona) and the Rule of Recognition (Hart)</i>	139
8.1.6. <i>Misinformation about Scandinavian Legal Realism</i>	142
8.2. A More Targeted Reckoning with "Validity" in Legal Discourse	145
8.2.1. <i>The Broad and the Narrow Sense of Competence Norms and Norms of Conduct</i>	145
8.2.2. <i>On the Function of a Valid Slap</i>	146
8.2.3. <i>The Metonymic Validity of Legal Directives and Texts of Law</i>	147
8.2.4. <i>The Slippery Slope of Validity. Norms Cannot Be Issued, or Enacted</i>	149
8.2.5. <i>Validity in Its Traditional Sense as a Source of Misguided Legal Normativism: Validity, Law in Force, and Normativeness</i>	156
8.2.6. <i>Going beyond Hart in Treating the Relationship between Validity and Normativeness in Law</i>	158
8.2.6.1. Intra-Systemic Norms	158
8.2.6.2. The Difference between Criteria and Rules as a Difference between Types and Norms	166
8.3. Hart's <i>Postscript</i> Compared with Hart 1961: An Abjuration of Normativeness in Law	172
8.3.1. <i>Hart's Masterpiece of 1961</i>	172
8.3.2. <i>Hart the Iconoclast: The <i>Postscript's</i> Destruction of the 1961 Portrait</i>	174
8.3.3. <i>Summing up on Hart 1961 and on Hart's <i>Postscript</i></i>	181

Chapter 9 - But Norms Are Not Enough.	
The Interaction between Language and Motives of Behaviour	187
9.1. From Norms to Propositions: The Analytical Emasculation	187
9.2. Indices, Symbols, and Conative Effects. Directives	190
9.3. Language That Bypasses the Motives of Behaviour: Suggestion and Charisma	198
9.4. Language That Overwhelms the Motives of Behaviour: Power	201
9.5. Language That Affects the Motives of Behaviour: Influence	202
9.5.1. <i>Influence Affecting Needs, Interests, and Values</i>	202
9.5.2. <i>Influence Affecting Norms</i>	203
9.6. Language That Modifies the Internalised Reality That Ought to Be: Authority (Integration between Norms and Validly Enacted Directives or Texts)	205
 Chapter 10 - The Law in Force: An Ambiguous Intertwining of Normativeness and Organised Power	 209
10.1. Underscoring the Role of Force in Law in order to Avoid Misunderstandings with regard to Normativism	209
10.2. The Law in Force	214
10.2.1. <i>Orthodoxia and Catholodoxia. The Normative Social Control on Believers: Dogmas, Heterodoxia, Paradoxia, Heresy</i>	214
10.2.2. <i>Dikedoxia. The Normative Social Control on Duty-Holders: The Idea of Just Coercion</i>	218
10.2.3. <i>The Characters of the Play, the Play of Characters</i>	222
10.2.4. <i>Who Is to Say What Is the Law in Force: The Judges as Managers of What Is Subjectively Right (Dikaspoloi)</i>	232
10.2.5. <i>The Law in Force as Domination (Herrschaft)</i>	240
10.2.6. <i>On Authority, Autonomy, and Heteronomy</i>	243
 Part Four - In Search of Confirming Others	 247
 Chapter 11 - The Reality That Ought to Be as Fate	 249
11.1. Consciousness of Death, Anxiety, and Self-Defensive Creation of Myth	249
11.2. <i>Heimarmenē</i> and <i>Moirā</i> : To Each His Own	260
11.3. The Double Conditionality of Fate. <i>Huper Moron</i> at the Origins of Chisholm's Paradox	262
11.3.1. <i>Kata Moiran: In Accordance with the Norm</i>	262

11.3.2. <i>The Possibility of Acting beyond the Norm:</i> Huper Moron	263
11.3.3. <i>The Fulfilment of the Second Condition: Huper Moron Behaviour, the Violation of the Norm. Chisholm's Paradox</i>	264
Chapter 12 - What Is Right in Homeric Epic	269
12.1. Homage to Eric A. Havelock	269
12.1.1. <i>Why Havelock?</i>	269
12.1.2. <i>A Heresy Unaccomplished</i>	271
12.1.3. <i>The Anthropology of the Homeric Poems: The Didactic Function of Epic in the Oral Civilisation of the Early Greek City-States</i>	275
12.2. A Revisitation of Homeric <i>Dikē</i> in the Light of the Distinction among "Norms," "What Is Objectively Right," and "What Is Subjectively Right"	279
12.2.1. <i>Premise</i>	279
12.2.2. <i>Norms and Society</i>	280
12.2.3. <i>Dikē as What Is Objectively Right</i>	283
12.2.4. <i>Dikai as What Is Subjectively Right and Its Management, That Is, Dikē as the Restoration of What Is Right</i>	288
12.2.5. <i>"Right" and "Wrong" as Adjectives Used to Qualify Things and People</i>	292
Chapter 13 - What Is Right, What Is Just, <i>Ratio</i> as Type: <i>Sanctus Thoma Docet</i>	295
13.1. <i>Jus</i> in the History of the Idea of What Is Right	295
13.2. Three Senses of <i>Quod Est Rectum</i> , or What Is Right. <i>Jus</i> as What Is Right (<i>Quod Est Rectum</i>) toward Others	297
13.3. <i>Jus</i> as the Objective of Justice: <i>Justitia Est Rectitudo Causaliter Tantum</i>	299
13.4. The Justice of Human-Posited Norms (<i>Justitia Legalis</i>) Presupposes the Constant and Perpetual Just Will of the Ruler Who Has the Community in His Care	303
13.5. In What Sense Is the Justice of Human-Posited Norms (<i>Justitia Legalis</i>) General	306
13.6. Prudence and Justice in the Judgments That Judges Are to Pass	312
13.7. <i>Jus</i> (What Is Right toward Others) Is Made Right, in What Concerns Its Essence (<i>Essentialiter</i>), by the Type (<i>Ratio</i>) Contained in a <i>Lex</i> (Norm)	315

13.8. <i>The Redde Rationem</i> (the Day of Reckoning): <i>Ratio</i> as Type in the Rendition of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province	324
Chapter 14 - The Law and What Is Right. Hans Kelsen under Suspicion	333
14.1. Prologue	333
14.2. Kelsen in the 1940s	333
14.3. A Few Other Contemporary English Translations of <i>objektives Recht</i> and <i>subjektives Recht</i>	336
14.4. The "Dualism" between <i>objektives Recht</i> and <i>subjektives Recht</i> : A Further Investigation into Kelsen	340
14.5. Kelsen's Reduction of What Is Subjectively Right to What Is Objectively Right. A Textual Analysis (or Rather a Crossword Puzzle)	341
14.6. How What Is Subjectively Right, Having Been Pushed out the Front Door, Slips in through the Back Disguised as an Individualised Norm	349
Chapter 15 - Nature and Culture	355
15.1. Summing up on My Confirming Others	355
15.2. Eighteen Thousand Centuries of Culture	357
15.2.1. <i>From Homo Habilis to Homo Sapiens Sapiens</i>	357
15.2.2. <i>Culture Encoded in Human Brains and Culture Inscribed in Documents and Artifacts</i>	358
15.2.3. <i>Types and Memory</i>	362
15.2.4. <i>What Is Mind? No Matter. What Is Matter? Never Mind. Social Construction of Reality and the Construction of Social Reality</i>	365
15.2.5. <i>Norms in the Formation of Individual Personality. Socialisation and Normative Revolution (Metanoia)</i>	368
15.3. The Micro-Macro Link	371
15.3.1. <i>Cognitive and Social Action: A Society of Minds</i>	371
15.3.2. <i>The Interaction between Social Structure and Character Structure</i>	374
15.3.3. <i>Norms and the Mental Implementation of a Social System</i>	379
15.3.4. <i>Internalising the Reality That Ought to Be: From Significant Others to the Generalised Other</i>	384
15.4. The Palingenesis of the Psychological Aspects of the Internal Point of View. Overcoming the Analytical Paradigm: Willard Van Orman Quine, John R. Searle, and the Neurosciences	389

15.5. A Few Closing Remarks That Go Back to What Is Right and Law: What Is Right by Nature and What Is Right by Law as Cultural Products	406
Appendix - Elements for a Formalisation of the Theory of Norms Developed in This Volume	
<i>(by Alberto Artosi, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, and Silvia Vida)</i>	413
1. Preliminaries	413
2. The Definition of "Norm"	415
3. Duty-Holder (Deontia) and Right-Holder (Exousia). The Being-in-Force and Not-Being-in-Force of a Norm. Efficaciousness and Inefficaciousness of a Norm	416
4. How Norms Proliferate in Human Minds	421
Bibliography	
<i>(Compiled by Antonino Rotolo)</i>	425
Index of Subjects	439
Index of Names	451