

THE VISIBLE HAND OF EUROPEAN
REGULATORY PRIVATE LAW(ERPL) -
THE TRANSFORMATION FROM AUTONOMY
TO FUNCTIONALISM IN COMPETITION
AND REGULATION

Hans W. MICKLITZ*

SUMMARY: I. *The hypothesis: erpl a self sufficient private legal order enshrining a new order of values.* II. *Creative destruction.* III. *The driving forces behind ERPL: economisation (internal market) and politicisation (governance).* IV. *The subject matter: the “visible” european private law.* V. *The construction of ‘general principles of ERPL’.* VI. *Towards the gradual substitution of national private legal orders.* VII. *The outlook of the new order: three layers of European regulatory private law.* VIII. *Research desing.*

I. THE HYPOTHESIS: ERPL A SELF SUFFICIENT PRIVATE
LEGAL ORDER ENSHRINING A NEW ORDER OF VALUES

There is a strong coincidence between ideological preconceptions of European constitution building and European private legal order building through the Draft Common Frame of Reference¹ which has not turned into the project on a Common European Sales Law (CESL).² The dictate at the moment

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¹ Draft Common Frame of Reference, Online Edition, 2009.

² COM(2011) 635 final.

seems to convey, more than ever, a quest to embark on constitutional pluralism and private law pluralism, bearing different headings in the private law discourse: “Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe” (*Wilhelmsson/E. Paunio/A. Phjolainen*),³ “Private Law Beyond the State” (*Michaels/Jansen*),⁴ or “Open Method of Co-Ordination” (*van Gerven*).⁵ However, outside political and academic debates, European constitution building and European private law construction steadily continues via secondary law making with the support of the Member States and via by the ECJ and national courts. My project focuses on ERPL beyond the boundaries of autonomy and freedom of contract guided national private legal orders (*L. Raiser, H. Collins*).⁶ I start from the following hypotheses:

- ERPL is developing through regulation and new modes of governance in subject matters usually regarded as being beyond traditional private law, for example consumer and anti-discrimination law, regulated markets, private competition law, state aids, public procurement, property rights and unfair commercial practices, risk regulation and standardisation of services,
- ERPL is striving for self-sufficiency, it is EU made and EU enforced, via old and new modes of governance,
- ERPL yields its own order of values, enshrined in the concept of access justice (*Zugangsgerechtigkeit*).

The focus of this socio-legal project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self sufficient European private legal order in its interaction with national private law systems.

- It aims at a new-orientation of the structures and methods of European private law based on its transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation.
- It suggests the emergence of a self sufficient European private law, composed of three different layers (1) the sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general principles —provisionally termed competitive contract law— and (3) common principles of civil law.

³ *Th. Wilhelmsson/E. Paunio/A. Phjolainen* (eds.), *Private Law and the Many Cultures Europe*, 2007.

⁴ *R. Michaels/N. Jansen*, *Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization*, (54) *American Journal of Comparative Law* 2006, 843.

⁵ *W. Van Gerven*, *Needed: A Method of Convergence for Private Law*, in A. Furrer (Hrsg.), *Europäisches Privatrecht im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs*, 2006, 437.

⁶ *L. Raiser, Die Zukunft des Privatrechts, 1971; H. Collins, Regulating Contracts*, 1999.

- It elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and national private law systems around four normative models: intrusion and substitution, conflict and resistance, hybridisation and convergence.

II. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION

The ERPL challenges the basis of our understanding of private law. Is the European Union —with the support of the majority of the Member States— ‘destroying’ ‘our’ national private law systems? What kind of private law is the European Union creating? Recalling de-juridification, de-politicisation and de-judicialisation (*Joerges*),⁷ can it continue to be regarded as law? (*Walker*)⁸ Is it a private legal order of big companies and informed customers/consumers who behave like small businessmen? Where do the truly weak groups stand and what role should be granted to small and medium sized companies?

I propose the use of *Schumpeter’s* formula of creative destruction⁹ as the starting point of analysis. Taken literally this formula would mean that private law, and its conception over centuries as an order inherently linked to the idea of a nation state, is drawing to an end. The European legislator would then be the ‘terminator’, who is undermining the ideological basis of the different national private legal orders, the overall assumption that *Privat-autonomie*, *freedom of contract* and *autonomie de la volonté* are the sole and decisive denominators.¹⁰ The standard justification for the opposite position is that ERPL does not develop in a legal vacuum. It is said to be based on and dependent of the national private law systems.

Much depends on the understanding, the role and the function of the state in a market economy. The European Union is not a fully-fledged state, but it is a strong regulator of private law relationships. In this sense, the European Union has much in common with the idea of the ‘market state’ (*Patterson/Afilalo*).¹¹ If we assume that the European regulator is disconnect-

⁷ Ch. *Joerges*, The Challenges of Europeanisation in the European Private Law, *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 24 (2005), 149.

⁸ N. *Walker*, Legal Theory and the European Union (2005) OJLS, 581.

⁹ <http://transcriptions.english.ucsb.edu/archive/courses/liu/english25/materials/schumpeter.html>.

¹⁰ See e.g. J. Basedow, Freedom of Contract in the European Union, 6 *European Review of Contract Law*, 2008, 901.

¹¹ D. *Patterson/A. Afilalo*, The New Global Trading Order, 2008. The relationship between the market state and European private law is more fully developed in H.-W. Micklitz/D. Patterson, From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law, *EUI Work-*

ing national private legal orders from their ideological basis, the question remains then as to what is ‘*constructive*’ in the destruction process? I begin from the premise that the EU is yielding a new concept of private law, one which is distinct from national preconceptions and one genuinely anchored in the European legal order.

III. THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND ERPL: ECONOMISATION (INTERNAL MARKET) AND POLITICISATION (GOVERNANCE)

The driving force behind the changing patterns of private law result from the economisation of private law via the Internal Market Programme and from its politicisation as enshrined in EU governance (*Weiler*).¹² Governance builds on networks rather than hierarchy, participation and mutual learning rather than command and control, iterative rather than discrete processes. “*Ökonomisierung*” and “*Politisierung*” set the frame within this project for a deeper understanding of what actually occurs in the field of visible private law.

(1) *Economisation and private law*: The strong market–approach has somewhat superseded “les grandes idées politiques”, which has guided the project of the “United States of Europe”, at least until the early nineties. The Internal Market Programme has become the (most stable and consistent) driving force behind the European integration process. This has been even more so since the 2004 enlargement—the joining of ten (now 12) new Member States from Middle and Eastern Europe—and the failure of the European Constitution project. The Lisbon Agenda 2000,¹³ the backbone of the “new economic approach”, could be understood as a revival and reinvigoration of the Internal Market Programme, albeit in light of the 21st century with emphasis on industrial policies. More forcefully than ever before, the European Commission is using the different sectors of economic law to render Europe ‘the most competitive economy of the world’ (language introduced in the Lisbon Agenda).

Private law was and still is needed to give shape to the Internal Market - what I have termed the economisation process. However, the private law referred to is not that which exists in national legal orders, that guided by

ing Paper 2012/15 = to be published in B. van Vorren/St. Blockmans/J. Wouters (eds.) *The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension*, OUP 2012/2013.

¹² *J.H.H. Weiler*, *The Transformation of Europe*, *Yale Law Journal* (100) 1991, 2403.

¹³ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/general_framework/c10241_en.htm.

private autonomy and freedom of contract. Rather it has two faces: it is regulatory in the sense that it is required in order to constitute the Internal Market, and it is competitive since the philosophy behind the regulatory measures relies heavily on market freedoms and competition. The strengthened market bias is paving the way for the infiltration of the Anglo–American understanding of the role and function of law (*Stürner*),¹⁴ which has normative implications: in the changing paradigm of justice, in the increasing importance of economic efficiency (via economic analysis of law in Europe), in economic impact assessments which forestall European law making; and once might even go so far as to imagine a gradual resemblance of European law to common law systems as opposed to continental codification.

(2) *Politicisation of private law*: The Internal Market Programme and “European Governance” emerged at the same time. Governance should close gaps between the capacity of the EU to promulgate rules and its ability to enforce them (*Héritier*).¹⁵ The so-called New Approach on Technical Standards and Regulations of 1985¹⁶ eventually led to the adoption of the so-called “comitology”; the regulation of administrative co-operation via committees. There is a direct link from “comitology” via “governance” to “European Constitution building”, as reflected in legal theory (*Joerges*),¹⁷ and European Governance mainly as a process of politicisation. This means, with regard to law and the role of the legal system in the European integration process, that the importance of law in the European integration process is decreasing whilst the impact of politics is increasing. There is no document of the European Commission establishing a link between governance and private law. However, one might argue that governance in private law compensates for the lack of traditional regulatory approaches in various boundary fields of private law as well as with regard to its main terrain, i.e. the right of obligations (DCFR).

Governance has a twofold impact on private law: it is fostering constitutionalisation of private law through constitutional and human rights (*Grundmann*)¹⁸ and it is establishing new modes of law making and law enforcement (*Cafaggi*).¹⁹ The question remains to be answered whether governance may only be democratically legitimated if basic procedural requirements such

¹⁴ R. Stürner, *Markt und Wettbewerb*, 2007.

¹⁵ A. Héritier, *Explaining Institutional Change in Europe*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

¹⁶ OJ C 136, 4.6.1985, 1.

¹⁷ Ch. Joerges, *The Challenges of Europeanisation in the European Private Law*, *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 24 (2005), 149.

¹⁸ St. Grundmann (ed.), *Constitutional Values and Contract Law*, 2008.

¹⁹ F. Cafaggi, (ed.) *The Institutional framework of European private law*, OUP, 2006.

as transparency, participation and accountability are safeguarded and if the enforceability of these parameters via individual and/or collective rights is secured.²⁰

IV. THE SUBJECT MATTER: THE “VISIBLE” EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW

The fields of analysis are united by a predominant Internal Market perspective combining the four freedoms with competition.

(1) *A new order of values*: ERPL is not bound to a model of social justice in the sense of distributive justice as it is known in the national legal orders in the form of the materialisation of contract law. ERPL is dancing to a different theoretical tune. Its scope is to ensure access to the Internal Market for those who cannot manage to pass the threshold by themselves. ERPL formulates a normative programme for setting access barriers aside. I have chosen the term ‘access justice (*Zugangsgerechtigkeit*)’, which goes beyond a libertarian concept of freedom, placing the realisation of access and the surmounting of possible impediments in the hands of individuals.²¹ Access justice requires activity on the part of the EU in order to deconstruct possible barriers to the internal market. Private autonomy in ERPL is always only ever regulated private autonomy. It is not, unlike national orders, a given. Regulated autonomy serves the paradigm of access justice.

(2) *The scope of regulatory private law*: Elsewhere (*Yearbook of European Law*),²² I have set out the fields inclined to ERPL: 1) consumer law; 2) non-discrimination law; 3) regulated markets: telecommunication, energy, transport; insurance, capital markets and company law; 4) property rights and unfair commercial practices law, 5) private competition law, state aids and public procurement; 6) regulation of health and safety; and 7) standardisation of services outside regulated markets. Each of these areas specifically contributes to ERPL, via mandatory rules, via co- and self-regulation.

V. THE CONSTRUCTION OF ‘GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ERPL’

These general principles (*Tridimas*)²³ reflect the functional approach of the ERPL. ERPL constantly blurs the lines of demarcation between legal fields,

²⁰ for a discussion M. Dawson, *New Governance and the Proceduralization of European Law: The Case of the Open Method of Coordination*, phd EUI Florence 2009.

²¹ H.-W. Micklitz (ed.), *The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law*, Elgar 2011.

²² See reference in fn. 1 and St. Grundmann, *Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht*, 1999.

²³ T. Tridimas, *The General Principles of EU Law*, 2nd edition, 2006.

public and private law, statutory regulatory law and private regulation (the instrumental use of private law via private actors), regulatory law and private-autonomous law, between legal effects and interdependencies of apparently adjacent legal fields, between individual and collective legal constructs, and even between bilateral and a multisided contractual model.

(1) *The instrumental protective control approach*: The addressees of European private law regulation are vulnerable people, in particular part-timer employees, pregnant women, young people and children, but also business people. The protective approach is to be understood as instrumental. The addressees are the duty-bearing beneficiaries of regulatory private law. They ought to be reintegrated into the labour market. Consumers should assist the breakthrough of cross-border exchange of goods and services. Business people should gain access to new markets, which have thus far remained closed. Protection is always functional, it pertains to the tasks of the particular addressees in their own sectors of the economy.

(2) *The interlocking of advertisement, pre-contractual information and contract conclusion*: The legal medium through which this aim is achieved is information regulation. Contract related directives and regulations aim to improve the legal position of the weaker assisted by a network of informational duties. The closer to the point of conclusion, the greater the duty to provide information. Duties of transparency, pre-contractual information duties and actual conclusion of contract rules converge. The scope of this paradigm change, initiated by regulatory private law, can be seen in the necessity to rethink the need to fence off the legal effects of unfair commercial practices from its impact on contract law.²⁴ Actions for injunction, setting an end to unfair commercial practices, might gain importance in private law follow on disputes.

(3) *Competitive and contractual transparency*: Competitive transparency ought, like the framework rules on competition, state aids, and public procurement law, guarantee pre-contractual competition. Competitive transparency ought to put a contracting party in a position so as to be capable, prior to concluding the contract, of recognising and weighing up the pros and cons of a potential contract with various contractual partners on the basis of the information provided. Contractual transparency, on the other hand, ought to place parties in a position of understanding the reciprocal rights and duties that flow from a contract once it is concluded.²⁵ Competi-

²⁴ H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, N. Reich, AGB-Recht und UWG – (endlich) ein Ende des Kästchendenkens nach EuGH in Perenicova und Invitel? EWS 2012, 257-264.

²⁵ A major German insurer (ERGO) has set up a program which it is heavily advertising and which aims explicitly at improving the comprehensibility of insurance contracts.

tive and contractual transparency are not only intertwined on account of their content, they are interlocking because of the formation of legal remedies. A breach of the principle of competitive transparency in the prelude to a contract can have effects in the context of contractual transparency and therefore on the validity of the contract itself.

(4) *Standardisation of contracts via information duties*: Since the 1980s, ERPL has tried and tested informational duties as a means of rectifying the instrumentally protection-orientated approach, in particular in the field of services. The informational duties are so narrowly drafted, that they actually come close to providing a contractual template.²⁶ ERPL subjugates, the contract to various purposes. Only a closed and relatively consistent contractual model, identical throughout the EU, can guarantee that such contracts are concluded and that the corresponding sectors achieve the sought after aims. The standardisation meets the interests of the trade. Rather than autonomy and free negotiation of contractual rights and duties being decisive here, the ensuring of functionally calibrated contract for the relevant purpose is key.

(5) *Elimination of market distortions*: Black and grey lists with incriminating contractual stipulations have had a rather more invalidating effect. Here, we are concerned with the elimination of contractual features which have been earmarked as undesirable from the perspective of the Union legal order. Traditionally, the instruments of legal control are analysed under the perspective of social calibration of contract law. ERPL is equipped with three types of rules, which should be weeded out with the help of their particular contractual techniques, a) horizontally, just as they come to be expressed in the unfair terms and the unfair commercial practice directives,²⁷ b) thusly related to certain branches, such as in insurance law,²⁸ and c) contract type-related prohibitions, which are distributed over all of European private law.²⁹

(6) *Post-contractual cost-free or cost-reduced withdrawal and cancellation rights*: The free or economical reasonable escape from a contract is one of the key

²⁶ That is why it does not suffice to criticize the rise of information duties under a law and economics perspective. It might well be that information duties are expensive for business and useless for consumers, but this does not deprive information duties from being used as building blocks for the elaboration of model contracts, see H. Collins (ed.) *Standard Contract Terms in Europe, A Basis for an Challenge to European Contract Law*, Wolter Kluwer, 2008.

²⁷ Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices.

²⁸ J. Basedow/T. Fock (Hrsg.), *Europäisches Versicherungsrecht*, Band 1 und 2, 2002.

²⁹ E.g. mandatory provisions in the time sharing Directive 2008/122/EC, the package tour directive 90/314/EEC or the consumer sales Directive 99/44/EC.

instruments of competitive contract law. Reduced risk in contract conclusion and reduced risk in contract escaping correlate. ERPL tends to make the entry into a contract as easy as possible, in that the addressee no longer bears or bears only a very easily discharged duty to research the information relevant to the contract; rather, the information is available to him/her by law. By means of the cordoning off of unfair commercial practices and contract law, which can occur as a result of the interpenetration of the legal effects of individual and collective legal protection, pre-contractual protection against dis- or misinformation takes on a new quality. If this mechanism for whatever reason fails, the needy addressee has the option of quickly and easily stepping back from the contract, free of costs or at low costs. The ECJ (*Quelle, Messner, Putz/Weber*)³⁰ has confirmed such an interpretation.

(7) *Legal protection through ADR, judicial and administrative enforcement:* As the European Union has no explicit competences for regulating enforcement, perhaps, with the exception of transborder issues, enforcement is integrated into the subject matter of regulation. Outside continental private legal orders, substantive and procedural law are not really separated. Slowly, the institutional framework is taking shape, in which collective legal protection can be situated. Emphasis is shifting from judicial to administrative enforcement via regulators, maybe even in the upcoming domain of collective compensation. In relation to the calibration of individual legal protection, ERPL rules provide for subject related individual rights and remedies. These individual rights and remedies are never meant to be exhaustive. The respective directives and regulations repeat in mildly varying terms, the ECJ-coined formula that legal protection must be effective, deterrent and proportionate. Far more concrete are the attempts of the EU to oblige the Member States to develop suitable non-coercive conflict resolution mechanisms. At the time of writing the EU is about to introduce an EU wide harmonised mechanism for Online Dispute Resolution and Alternative Dispute Resolution.³¹

VI. TOWARDS THE GRADUAL SUBSTITUTION OF NATIONAL PRIVATE LEGAL ORDERS

My suggested perspective, one which looks at the national private legal orders from the perspective of ERPL, allows for the formulation of a set of hypotheses which suggest deeper, if not dramatic, changes in private law

³⁰ ECJ Case C-404/06 - *Quelle*, ECR 2008, I-2685; ECJ Case C-489/07 - *Messner*, ECR 2009, I-7315; ECJ joined Cases C-65/09, C-87/09 - *Putz/Weber* 2011 ECR I-nyr.

³¹ http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_policy_work_en.htm.

matters. What I am trying to formulate are *conceptual and normative assumptions* on the possible future development of the ERPL to displace national private legal orders thereby turning the different fields into self-sufficient legal orders widely disconnected from the national private law strand. This could be realised via the downgrading of international private law, via the substitution of minimum with maximum harmonisation, and last but not least via the transformation of directives into de facto regulations.

(1) *Decreasing the role of international private law*: From an orthodox view, Rome I (Regulation 593/2008 on contractual obligations) and Rome II (Regulation 864/2007 on non-contractual obligations) are milestones in the development of a bottom-up European private law via the balancing out of conflicts between 27 divergent legal orders and their values. There is room for international private law, as long as the application of the rules, whether private or public, does not stop at the border. Only where national rules are bound to their territorial scope is international private law out of play (*Muir Watt*).³² However, ERPL is intended to set common European standards which are bound, if at all, to the territory of the European Union (*Ingmar*).³³ That is why Rome I and Rome II are only of limited significance coming into play only where EU law does not lay down the standards itself, either by minimum or maximum harmonisation, or by anchoring the country of origin principle. The EU legislature did not even allow for the acknowledgment in Rome I or in Rome II of the DCFR as a voluntarily 28th private legal order. For the perpetuation of varied value-orders there remains little scope.³⁴

(2) *Better regulation through increased consistency and coherency*: Since the promulgation of the Lisbon Agenda 2000, the EU has made it its task to legislate more coherently, and to avoid a fragmentation of results to similarly rooted problem cases. The European Commission even offers a particular website on 'better regulation'.³⁵ The efforts toward rendering the various fields of ERPL more consistent and strengthening its efforts in view of establishing better implementation practices in the Member States are obvi-

³² H. Muir Watt, *Integration and Diversity: The Conflict of Laws as a Regulatory Tool*, in F. Cafaggi (ed.), *The Institutional Framework of European Private Law*, 2006, 107; Ch. Joerges/F. Rödl, *Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts II: Die kollisionsrechtliche Form einer legitimen Verfassung der post-nationalen Konstellation*, in: Calliess/Fischer-Lescano/Wielsch/Zumbansen (Hrsg.), *Soziologische Jurisprudenz. Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag*, 2009, 775.

³³ ECJ, C-381/98 – *Ingmar* ECR 2000, I-9305.

³⁴ See H. Muir-Watt/R. Sefton-Green, *Fitting the frame: an optional instrument, party chance and mandatory default rules*, in H.-W. Micklitz/F. Cafaggi (eds.), *European Private Law After the Common Frame of Reference*, 2010, 201.

³⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm.

ous. Implicitly the European Commission pushes for the verticalisation of the different areas, thereby making the horizontalisation at both the EU level i.e. between the various areas —and at the national level i.e. between the EU rules and the national private legal orders— more difficult. A tried and tested means to separate horizontal national and sectoral EU regulatory law, would be the conversion of EU directives into EU regulations. A general tendency in this direction cannot be detected, even if the Brussels Regulation, Rome I, Rome II, bits and pieces of energy and telecommunication law, as well as the entirety of passenger law have been promulgated in the form of regulations. However, the European Commission³⁶ is gradually shifting the focus from that of replacing directives with regulations.

(3) *Expanding competences through regulatory techniques*: The European Commission paid great attention to the principle of mutual recognition as well as the country of origin principle, but failed in the end. Currently, it is concentrating its efforts on the anchoring of the principle of full harmonisation in regulatory private law.³⁷ The consequences of the about-turn from minimum to maximum harmonisation are serious. Regulatory competence passes to the EU, which oversees the implementation process and can engage the ECJ's controlling function. New juridical battle lines are drawn, partly triggered by the ECJ and ideologically (not argumentatively) in line with the Lisbon Agenda (*Gonzales Sanchez, Gysebrecht, VTB, Mediaprint, Plus Warengesellschaft*),³⁸ as the question becomes increasingly prominent, to what extent does full harmonisation or mutual recognition stretch? There is a close relationship between favouring or at least admitting full harmonisation and rejecting mutual recognition. The rejection of the principle of mutual recognition, which contains a conflict of law element in respect of differences, comes at a price. Paradoxically enough, it promotes the trend towards (full) harmonisation.

(4) *Governance through EU induced private regulation*: EU induced private regulation, i.e. the regulations and directives in the various fields setting incentives for private regulation, appear as just another means to prolong the instrumental use of regulatory law in completing the objectives of the Internal Market. Transplanted into the perspective of better regulation which strives for coherency and consistency, direct or indirect state induced private regulation

³⁶ COM (2007) 502 final.

³⁷ For an overall discussion G. Howells/R. Schulze (eds.), *Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law*, 2009.

³⁸ ECJ, Case C-183/00 *Gonzales Sanchez* ECR 2002, I-3901, ECJ Case C- 205/07 *Gysbrechts* ECR 2008 I-9947; ECJ Case C-261/07 and C-269/07 *VTB-VAB* ECR 2009, I-2949; ECJ Case C-540/08 – *Mediaprint* ECR 2010, I-10909; ECJ Case C-304/08 *Plus Warengesellschaft* ECR 2010, I-217.

though being part of the better regulation approach seems to point exactly into the opposite direction – incoherency and inconsistency. Whilst it seems true that sector related private regulation must fit the needs of the particular business in question or the particular purpose the EU rules are designed for, it seems equally necessary to underline that the principles of transparency, participation, accountability and judicial review should apply equally to all forms of private regulation, whatever the subject matter might be (*Cafaggi, Joerges*).³⁹

(5) *Creeping competences through new modes of law making and law enforcement*: Academic attention is focusing on new modes of law making, both inside state induced private regulation and outside (*Cafaggi/Muir Watt*).⁴⁰ What is much less visible is that the European Commission is becoming more and more involved with law enforcement. Conflict resolution; be it individual or collective shall be managed. This seems to be the European Commission's idea via regulatory agencies within the respective fields of competence. Where there are no European regulatory agencies, or where the European regulatory agencies have no formal regulatory competences, the European Commission steps in and formulates enforcement strategies and enforcement programmes outside its formal competences putting pressure on the Member States and their enforcement entities, be they administrative or not, to direct their attention to those issues which, according to the European Commission, deserve prior attention in securing compliance with the respective European rules. In this sense, the European Commission is developing entirely new modes of enforcement governance, it is out-sourcing enforcement to private companies, and establishing networks within which the lines between administrative and profit orientated private enforcement strategies are intermingled.⁴¹

VII. THE OUTLOOK OF THE NEW ORDER: THREE LAYERS OF EUROPEAN REGULATORY PRIVATE LAW

Neither the Member States nor the European Commission have grasped the nettle with regards to clarifying the relationship between the legal or-

³⁹ Ch. Joerges, *The Challenges of Europeanisation in the European Private Law*, *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 24 (2005), 149; F. Cafaggi, (ed.) *The Institutional framework of European private law*, OUP, 2006.

⁴⁰ F. Cafaggi/H. Muir Watt (eds.), *Making European Private Law, Governance Design*, 2008; F. Cafaggi/H. Muir Watt (eds.), *The Regulatory Function of European Private Law*, 2009.

⁴¹ See H.-W. Micklitz, *Administrative Enforcement of Private Law*, in R. Brownsword/H.-W. Micklitz/L. Niglia/St. Weatherill (eds.), *Foundations of European Private Law*, Hart Publishing 2011, 563-591.

ders. This task has fallen to national and European courts, as well as to the academia. I will define the different layers of European regulatory private law and national private law which have been yielded out of the ongoing process of the Europeanisation of private law. This could easily be understood as an attempt to recognise a kind of new ‘Ordnung’ in the chaos (*Möslein*)⁴² which results from the ongoing destruction of national private legal orders.

(1) *Self-sufficient sectoral European market orders*: The European Union regulates central areas of economic life, without considering the interpenetration of public economic and private law, overstepping the boundaries between state made law and private made law through new forms of governance in the rule setting via co-regulation and enforcement via outsourcing and privatisation. My suggestion is that behind this lies the implicit normative and conceptual assumption that sectoral orders may, broadly speaking, stand for themselves. I would suggest the following trend towards self-sufficient sectoral legal orders: *horizontal orders*: a) consumer law together with unfair commercial practices and b) anti-discrimination law, these two areas are at the forefront of the current analysis; *vertical orders*: a) regulated markets – telecommunication, energy, transport and financial services, b) pre-market risk regulation for chemicals, pesticides, foodstuff, consumer goods, post market control and product liability, c) private competition law, state aids and public procurement and d) regulation of services via European standards bodies.

Self-sufficiency has two strains, law making and law enforcement. Law making no longer lies in the hands of the European Union alone. Through co-regulation and self regulation a variety of rule setting institutions join in. The law making process has become heteronomous. The combination of public law making and private law making via co-regulation paves the way for the internationalisation of standard setting. Secondly self-sufficiency refers to the phenomenon that each market order may —this again is my assumption— function without a direct link to national private legal orders. That is why it does not suffice to look at the substantive law. A full understanding of the closeness of the sectoral market orders requires the inclusion of enforcement in the analysis: via regulatory agencies or via self-regulatory bodies, via individual or collective actions, via conflict resolution through litigation in courts or before administrative authorities or via dispute settlement through agencies, through self-regulatory bodies or through collective actions.

(2) *General principles in European regulatory private law*: The suggested *general principles* (see point 5. In this text) shall ideally reveal common denominators

⁴² F. Möslein, *Contract Governance and Corporate Governance*, JZ 2010, 72.

between the various fields of European regulatory private law. They shall operate like a thread sewing the still heterogeneous areas together and allowing for mutual transplants across the narrow boundaries of the dispersed areas of European regulatory private law. Inherent to such thinking is the idea that European regulatory law is guided by a philosophy that, methodologically speaking, justifies cross-border (between the different areas of European regulatory private law) fertilisation. Setting consumer law aside it seems as if the Member States have followed the European approach in separating regulatory private law from the body of the national civil codes – as far as they exist. This facilitates the development of a self-sufficient European regulatory private legal order considerably.

(3) *General principles of civil law*: At a time when the political future of the CESL is still insecure, while simultaneously however, references from the national courts to Luxembourg in private law matters are heavily increasing, the ECJ has taken a bold step forward, on proposal of Advocate General *Maduro*, the ECJ refers in *Hamilton*⁴³ for the first time, to the ‘*general principles of civil law*’. In two further judgments decided in 2009, *Messner*⁴⁴ and *Audiolux*,⁴⁵ both on proposal of AG *Trstenjak*, the ECJ confirmed its preparedness to elaborate on the notion of ‘general principles of civil law’.

The ECJ does not provide much guidance as to the origins of the ‘general principles’. AG *Trstenjak* and, in relying on her opinions, the ECJ start from a comparative law approach via references to PECL, the DCFR and the Acquis Principles. There seems to be a certain preparedness to upgrade the DCFR to some sort of expert restatement of soft law standing. In such a perspective, the DCFR could serve as a constant source of ‘inspiration’ for developing principles, but not for seeking guidance to clear cut solutions. This move has raised much concern and debate in private law theory.⁴⁶ Outside and beyond the comparative analysis of European ‘rules’ the widely recognised constitutionalisation process of private law⁴⁷ provides

⁴³ ECJ Case C-412/06 - Hamilton, ECR 2008, I-2383.

⁴⁴ ECJ Case C-489/07 - Messner, ECR 2009, I-7315.

⁴⁵ Case C-101/08 – Audiolux, ECR 2009, I-09823.

⁴⁶ U. Bernitz (ed.) *General Principles of EU law and European Private Law* (forthcoming 2012), see also St. Weatherill, *The principles of civil law as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis*, ERCL 2010, 74.

⁴⁷ O. Cherednychenko, *Fundament Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party: A Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation of the Contract Law with Emphasis on Risky Financial Transactions*, doctoral dissertation – Utrecht University, 2008; Ch. Mak, *Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008.

for an additional source, via the European Economic Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The former opens the door to the case law on the four freedoms in all its ambiguities and in its impact on private law (*Steindorff*),⁴⁸ the second to the increasing importance of the Charter in the interpretation of EU law. In *Küçükdeveci*⁴⁹ the ECJ recognised the horizontal direct effect of the Charter, thereby overcoming reservations voiced in the Lisbon Treaty against the applicability of the Charter.

VIII. RESEARCH DESIGN

In the overall project which started in September 2011 and which will last until August 2016, I will demonstrate (1) the transformation of European private law from autonomy to regulation and competition and (2) the emergence of a new order of values enshrined in the concept of access justice/*Zugangsgerechtigkeit*. This twofold shift produces tensions between the alleged market bound European private law and the state bound national private legal systems.

In a *first* step I will sketch four normative models on the relationship between the two legal orders —conflict and resistance— intrusion and substitution —hybridisation— convergence and their theoretical grounding in legal theory and institutional economics. These four normative models constitute the areas in which socio-legal research needs to be undertaken. In a *second* step I will link the four normative models to particular types of institutions:

- Conflict and resistance to differing orders of values,
- Intrusion and substitution to regulated markets,
- Hybridisation to remedies and
- Convergence to co/self-regulation.

This allows me to transform the overall theoretical frame into a concrete research design around the four normative models and their particular links to European regulatory private law. Based on the findings in the four sub-projects, in the *third* step, I will give shape to the suggested transformation process, from autonomy to regulation and competition and to the emergence of a new order of values.

⁴⁸ E. Steindorff, *EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht*, 1996; A. Hartkamp, *European Law and National Private Law*, Kluwer 2012.

⁴⁹ There is a wealth of literature on horizontal direct effect of fundamental rights, mainly in connection with the constitutionalisation debate, see fn. 48.

As the project is now lasting for more than a year the following is more than a description of the envisaged method it is likewise a progress report on a project in action. We have set up our own website which reports on the ongoing activities.⁵⁰

(1) Step 1 – Four normative models and their theoretical grounding: The four normative models are intended to capture the set of variants available in the relationship between European regulatory private law and national private law. They reflect of what I have termed European regulatory private law. A first workshop organised in May 2012 in Florence is aiming at deepening and clarifying the meaning of the four models.⁵¹

Conflict and resistance: This is suggested as one of the possible reactions of the Member States. The perspective is that the Member States do not give way to the intruding European regulatory private law. Instead, they provoke a clash between the European regulatory private law and the national law and set limits to where the intruding law ends and where the national laws begin.

Intrusion and substitution: This is suggested to be the perspective of the current EU law-making and law enforcement strategies, enshrined in the idea of a self-sufficient order composed of three major elements: (1) the horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (2) the general principles enshrined in the horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (3) the general principles of civil law.

Hybridisation: This is suggested to be an overall normative model of a composite legal order, within which the European and the national legal orders both play their part in some sort of a merged European-national private legal order. Hybridisation means that the legal character of the respective rule is neither European nor national. It bears elements of both legal orders and is therefore supposed to be hybrid.

Convergence: This is suggested to be a process of mutual approximation of the two different legal orders. They are not merged like in the concept of hybridisation, they still exist side by side, but they are drawing nearer to each other. Convergence is not bound to mandatory standards and default rules. It instead enshrines in particular the new modes of governance, co-regulation and self-regulation, which are enhanced by limited and limiting state powers.

⁵⁰ <http://blogs.eui.eu/erc-erpl/>.

⁵¹ H.-W. Micklitz/Yane Svetiev (eds.), A self-sufficient European private law – A viable concept? EUI Working Paper 2012/31.

A common theoretical background

The four categories share a common theoretical background. The idea is to combine legal theories on the transformation of private law into economic law (*L. Raiser*)⁵² with theories analysing private law beyond the state (*Michaels/Jansen*).⁵³ In order to fully grasp the change in paradigm the project draws on institutional economics as an analytic framework. A first workshop organised in September 2012 was devoted to the deepening of the methodological approach.⁵⁴

The concept of ‘institutions’⁵⁵ that I intend to use in order to get to grips with the ‘substance’ of European regulatory private law —understood as the rules regulating the structure of human interaction, composed of formal (legal) and informal (social) constraints and their enforcement— complies with the institutional design of legal orders, notwithstanding their origin, be it European or national. In this light, legal theories help to understand and to explain the transformation process on a more abstract theoretical level. The insights of institutional economics allow for an analysis of how exactly the transformation process of the two legal orders occurs or in the language of institutional economics how the ‘institutional change’ reaching beyond national political economies manifests itself.

The strong sometimes even static association of a particular type of national political economy does not leave much room for the interpenetration of different political economies. In such a perspective, the non-convergence thesis of legal orders defended by *P. Legrand*⁵⁶ and the categorisation of the varieties of capitalism developed by *Hall/Soskice*⁵⁷ share a common origin. This variant will have to be analysed under the category ‘conflict and resistance’. National political economies, just as national legal orders, stand side by side. The different ‘autonomies’ enshrined in Member States’ private legal orders would then have to be mobilised against European regulatory

⁵² L. Raiser, *Die Zukunft des Privatrechts*, 1971.

⁵³ R. Michaels/N. Jansen, *Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization*, (54) *American Journal of Comparative Law* 2006, 843.

⁵⁴ <http://blogs.eu.eu/erc-erpl/activities>.

⁵⁵ “Institutions: The rules of the game: the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (such as rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics”, <http://www.coase.org/nieglossary.htm>.

⁵⁶ P. Legrand, *European Legal Systems Are Not Converging* (1996) 45 *ICLQ* 52.

⁵⁷ P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds.): *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, 2001.

intrusion. National legal orders, being understood as institutions, are suggested to build barriers against the incoming tide of European regulatory private law – to paraphrase the famous word of *Lord Denning*.⁵⁸

Just like private law theory is becoming increasingly involved with the debate on private law beyond the state, research in institutional economics is reaching further and further beyond the boundaries of national political economies, thereby emphasising ‘institutional change’ and/or ‘institutional flexibility’ (*Lane/Wood*)⁵⁹ The more radical strand of the new research in institutional economics yields the question whether private legal orders would have to be understood as institutions, disconnected from the nation states and organised around markets, not around states. Particularly telling are the findings on regional and sectoral varieties of capitalism (*Crouch/Schröder/Voelzkow*).⁶⁰ This comes near to observed trends in European regulatory private law striving for normative self-sufficiency, here captured in the model of ‘intrusion and substitution’.

Somewhere in the middle lies the task of combining an emphasis on institutional flexibility with retention of the idea that there exists distinctive types of political economy, resulting from the country’s history, enshrined in the common knowledge and the common culture (*Hall/Soskice*).⁶¹ The combined approach, the so-called historical institutionalism, introduced two categories into the debate —hybridisation and convergence (*W. Streek/K. Thelen*,⁶² in *legal theory N. Reich*,⁶³ v. *Gerven*)— which have become fashionable in legal doctrine, often without disclosing its origin in institutional economics. In institutional economics both hybridisation and convergence imply the need to look at the formal constraints, the informal constraints and the enforcement characteristic in order to get a full picture of the institutional change. Both concepts seem to be well suited in catch-

⁵⁸ ...when we come to matters with a European element, the treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back.. (1974) 2 AII E.R. 1226, 1231.

⁵⁹ Ch. Lane/G. Wood, Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism, *Economy and Society*, 39 (2009) 531.

⁶⁰ C. Crouch/M. Schröder/H. Voelzkow, Regional and sectoral varieties of capitalism, *Economy and Society*, 39 (2009), 654.

⁶¹ P.A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds.): *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, 2001.

⁶² W. Streek/K. Thelen (eds.), *Beyond continuity: Institutional change in advanced political economies*, 2005.

⁶³ N. Reich, Horizontal liability in EC law: Hybridization of remedies for the compensation in case of breaches of EC rights, *CMLRev.* 2007, 705.

ing the compartmentalised character of European regulatory private law, whilst insisting on the genuine national character of private legal orders, thereby yielding hybrid institutions or provoking convergence of inherently different institutions.

(2) *Step 2 – The four normative models (conflict – intrusion – hybridisation – convergence) and their impact on the different subject matters:* Combining legal theory and institutional economics allows for building correlations between the relationship between intrusion – conflict – hybridisation – convergence and the different areas of European regulatory private law:

- Conflict and resistance: value conflicts between different forms of capitalism are suggested to emerge in consumer, anti discrimination, unfair commercial practices law, private competition, state aids and public procurement law, thereby confirming the static assumptions of particular forms of capitalism to which Member States belong,
- Intrusion and substitution: self-sufficiency might succeed, if at all, in regulated markets (energy, telecom, financial services), thereby overruling and out-ruling national private legal orders
- Hybridisation: remedies in consumer, anti-discrimination, private competition, state aids, public procurement might be developed out of European regulatory private law and national private law, thereby leading to a truly integrated legal device,
- Convergence: co-regulation in risk regulation and standardisation of services, self-regulation in those areas where party autonomy/freedom of contract/autonomie de la volonté still prevails, thereby maintaining the specificities of the European and the national legal orders, but bringing them more closely together.

The four normative models linked to subjects, countries, working hypotheses and projects

The chart provides for an overview of the intended research. It indicates the subject matters where the research will be located, highlights the countries which have —tentatively— to be taken into consideration, spells out the dominant working hypotheses and concretises the research projects. It likewise identifies not only the concrete topics on which the project is now focussing but also attributes the different projects to those collaborators who are working on the respective issues.

	<i>Subjects – institutional design</i>	<i>Countries – institutional design</i>	<i>Emphasis – dominance – relevance</i>	<i>Research projects – innovative and paradigmatic</i>
<i>Conflict + resistance of NPL against ERPL</i>	Consumer Anti-discrimination Unfair commercial practices Private competition state aids, public procurement	Defence of freedom: UK and new MSF. Defence of justice: D, F, Nordic countries	Testing clash of values bly: (consumer, anti-discrimination) bly access for SME's and researchers	1 project on social and economic discrimination (undertaken by H. W. Micklitz and G. Conzatti)
<i>Integration + substitution of ERPL in NPL</i>	Regulated markets Energy Telecom and postal services Transport Financial services Universal services	More study a rather homogeneous approach in all Member States Conflict and resistance stronger in Nordic countries, France and Italy	Testing self sufficiency bly: bly	1 project on regulated markets (telecommunication) by Maria Carstén 1 project cutting across regulated markets (Yoon Sunkoo)
<i>Hybridisation (ERPL + NPL mutually complementary tools and vehicles)</i>	ERPL in a varying degree	More study in homogeneous legal orders and fully substituted national orders	Testing hybrid mediation	1 project on mediation cutting across the different ERPL
<i>Convergence (approximation of ERPL and NPL)</i>	Risk regulation Standardisation of services Self-Regulation	More study in old MSF with consistent legal order Self-Regulation more likely in UK and new Member States	Testing CoR in risk regulation or standardisation Self-Regulation in autonomy guided areas	1 project on standardisation of services (Harald von Lewinski)

Four research projects, suggested countries, co-operation partners and research profiles

The research projects must be paradigmatic in that they reflect the theoretical concept of European regulatory private law (the three layers: the self-sufficient sectoral market orders, the general principles and the common principles of civil law) and innovative in that they enter into new fields of private law research. Co-operation partners will be needed in the selected countries.

- 1 project on social and economic discrimination, building on ‘Politics of Judicial-Co-operation’, lays down the theoretical ground for the suggested new understanding of ERPL. The major objective would be to test the hypothesis of conflict and resistance in countries with a liberal economy (UK), a strong social-welfare market economy (Nordic countries, Germany) and in countries to be located in the middle ground (France, Italy). The innovative potential lies in the combination of social and economic discrimination. The intention is to define the new order of values, which is said to govern European regulatory private law, thereby cutting across the different areas of European regulatory private law. Since this sub-project lies at the heart of my own research on access justice (Zugangsgerechtigkeit), I will execute it myself. Guido Comparato, who defended his phd on ‘Nationalism in private law’ is focussing on the paradigm of inclusion/exclusion thereby complementing the access justice dimension.

-1 projects on regulated markets, building on ‘Kundenschutz auf liberalisierten Märkten’.⁶⁴ The major objective here would be to test the hypothesis of self-sufficiency of the emerging European private legal order. One will focus on the telecommunication sector (Marta Cantero). The other cuts across the different sector related rules and covers the following countries: United Kingdom and Sweden (administrative governance), France and Italy (political governance), Germany (judicial governance). It is executed by Yane Svetiev who combines deep knowledge of regulated markets with behavioural economics.

- 1 project on remedies in European regulatory private law to test the reach of hybridisation, cutting across judicial, administrative and political

⁶⁴ J. Keßler/H.-W. Micklitz, Kundenschutz auf den liberalisierten Märkten —Vergleich der Konzepte, Maßnahmen und Wirkungen in Europa— Energie, VIEW Schriftenreihe, Band 23, 2008; J. Keßler/H.-W. Micklitz, Kundenschutz auf den liberalisierten Märkten – Vergleich der Konzepte, Maßnahmen und Wirkungen in Europa –Personenverkehr/Eisenbahn, VIEW Schriftenreihe, Band 24, 2008; J. Keßler/H.-W. Micklitz, Kundenschutz auf den liberalisierten Märkten Vergleich der Konzepte, Maßnahmen und Wirkungen in Europa – Telekommunikation, VIEW Schriftenreihe, Band 25, 2008.

enforcement/governance and encompassing individual as well as collective enforcement, building on 'New Frontiers in Consumer Protection'⁶⁵ and 'Das Verbandsklagerecht in der Informationsgesellschaft'.⁶⁶ The role and function of remedies in a complementary institutional design that brings together judicial, political and administrative enforcement is under-researched. The countries to be investigated will be selected along the lines of the different enforcement/government structures, UK, NL, Nordic countries, Germany, Italy or France. It is executed by Betül Kas.

- 1 project on co/self-regulation in the field of standardisation of services, testing the convergence hypothesis, building on 'Internationales Produktsicherheitsrecht' and 'Service Standards: Defining the Core Elements'. Co/self-regulation in the field of services is still a black box. The project allows for the investigation of SME's which are mostly concerned. Previous research on liability of services provides for a promising base.⁶⁷ Outside and beyond the UK, Germany, France or Italy as well as Nordic countries, particular emphasis will be put on the new Member States since old Member States are very much concerned by cross-border services affecting their legal orders. The project is executed by Barend van Leuwen.

Research methodology

The starting point for the analysis of the four projects results from classical legal methodology, with particular emphasis on European law and comparative private law. Secondly, the four projects bear a strong factual (socio-legal) dimension rooted in the combination of legal theory and institutional economics. The making of the law, the choice of the instrument and the application/enforcement of these rules have to be carefully reconstructed. This can only be successfully completed when key actors are interviewed, avoiding sole reliance on written documents. Qualitative research produces outcomes that allow for meeting the generalising approach of legal research to be applied to society as a whole. This entails the selection of one appropriate rule, measure or decision/judgment, one which ideally reflects the whole policy enshrined in the selected field of research from cradle to grave,

⁶⁵ F. Cafaggi/H.-W. Micklitz (eds.), *New Frontiers of Consumer Protection – the Interplay between Private and Public Enforcement*, Elgar, 2009.

⁶⁶ H.-W. Micklitz/ A. Stadler (authors and editors), *Das Verbandsklagerecht in der Informations- und Dienstleistungsgesellschaft*, 2005, Landwirtschaftsverlag Münster.

⁶⁷ U. Magnus/H.-W. Micklitz, *Liability of the Safety for Services*, VIEWSchriftenreihe, Band 21, 2006.

and then to carefully reconstruct that particular rule/measure/decision/judgment. I have successfully applied such a research method in 'Politics of Judicial Co-operation'.⁶⁸ In the project I will co-operate with Th. Roethe with whom I have developed this particular approach.⁶⁹

Reconstruction in essence means that the material has to be as complete as possible, including the rule/measure/decision/judgment and the comments of academics, in order to define the arguments of the parties and to give shape to the role of the key actors (public officials in agencies, judges in courts). Reconstruction is a term borrowed from qualitative sociological methodology. The term refers to more than a mere compilation of empirical data, it seeks to decipher the structure of meaning in the ongoing process of argumentation which shapes the case at issue. This type of socio-legal analysis includes the interpretation of laws, documents, interviews with the parties concerned and the results of discourse and bargaining processes.

(3) *Step 3 - A private law theory built on the functional turn from autonomy to regulation and competition:* The findings of the four projects constitute the *first building block* in my intention to develop a normative model which suggests the emergence of a new private legal order. The sub-project on conflicting values is genuinely *horizontal*. It establishes the foundation on which the transformation process is based to varying degrees and in various forms as spelt out in the other three *vertical* sub-projects, the one on regulated markets, the one on remedies and the one on co/self-regulation of services. In this sense, the first premise of the suggested transformation process would have to be met.

What remains is the *second building block*, the merging together of the study on conflicting values with the other three sub-projects in order to discover whether the European transformation process, analysed in light of the four normative models conflicting values, intrusion and substitution, hybridisation and convergence, is guided by a common philosophy and a common set of values and principles enshrining competition and regulation and allowing for the understanding of private law as a coherent system or whether European regulatory private law can only be understood in its market related context, as a polycentric order, paying tribute to the many constitutions and the many private legal orders of Europe, thereby undermining any idea of the unity of private law.

⁶⁸ The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU – the Case of Sunday trading, Equal Treatment and Good Faith, 2005, Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁹ H.-W. Micklitz/Th. Roethe/St. Weatherill (eds.), Federalism and Responsibility – A study on Product Safety Law and Practice in the European Community, Graham & Trotmann, London, 1994.

Therefore the second building block aims at a new orientation of the structures and methods of European private law, based on its transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. *Therefore* the second building block is meant to reconsider and redefine the role and function of national private legal orders which varies according to the respective market order. *Therefore* the second building block intends to develop a multi-level vertically and horizontally integrated model which defines the role and function of national private legal orders that enshrine different values and one which takes into account the process of Europeanisation in the legislature, academia, and civil society (*Maduro*).⁷⁰ *Therefore* the objective of the research project as a whole is the development of a flexible co-ordination system of European regulatory private law and national private law as well as its theoretical implications. *Therefore* it entails a theoretical dimension which refers back to the sensitive relationship between economisation of private law via the Internal Market Programme and politicisation of private law via governance. It allows me to contribute not only to the development of a private legal theory but also to the constitutional dimension of the European integration process.

First horizontal block: conflict and resistance: new order of values, enshrined in the concept of access justice (zugangsgerechtigkeit)
Various sub projects on regulated markets, on remedies and on standardisation of services
Second horizontal building block: new-orientation of the structures and methods of european private law, based on its transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation

⁷⁰ P. Maduro, 'Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism', *European Journal of Legal Studies*, No. 1, Issue 2, 2007.